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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose there are several employees in a particular workplace who 
regularly engage in some behavior, x. The employer decides to terminate one of 
these employees, P, citing the fact of P’s x-ing. Recognizing that the employer’s 
rationale is insufficient to explain the decision to terminate P while not 
terminating the other x-ing employees, P challenges the employer to justify this 
differential adverse treatment. 
A logically satisfactory response would require the employer to identify 
some way in which P, or P’s x-ing, is different—i.e., some argument by which 
P’s x-ing provides sufficient reason for P’s termination, while not providing 
comparable reason for terminating the other x-ing employees. Of course, the 
employer may not be required legally to have any good reason at all for 
terminating P, so no such response may be necessary, let alone forthcoming. But 
there is, presumably, at least one important constraint on the reasons to which 
the employer can lawfully appeal in order to explain why P was singled out for 
his x-ing: those reasons cannot be discriminatory ones. 
But what does this mean? It is tempting to think that it must mean, at least, 
that the employer cannot lawfully justify P’s differentially adverse treatment 
relative to other x-ing employees simply by appealing to the fact of P’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.1 For example, if the behavior in question 
(x-ing) was arriving late to work, the employer surely could not justify 
terminating P while not terminating other similarly tardy employees simply by 
citing the fact that P is, say, of Asian descent. As a matter of law, P’s race simply 
cannot be a consideration that provides reason for treating P’s x-ing differently 
from that of other employees. 
But is it really true—for all x and for all P—that the employer in our simple 
hypothetical case could not lawfully justify the differential adverse treatment of 
P by appealing to the fact of P’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin? 
Even without resorting to elaborately concocted counterexamples, we can assign 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; Ph.D. Candidate (Philosophy), 
Harvard University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks to Akhil Amar, Eric Blumenson, Rosanna 
Cavallaro, Frank Cooper, Valerie Epps, Joe Franco, Betsy McKenzie, Andy Perlman, Louis Schulze, 
and Jessica Silbey for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to 
Emma Cecilia Eriksson for her excellent research assistance. 
 1. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
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at least one value to x that puts the answer into doubt: Let x be “wearing frilly 
pink dresses”;2 let P be a man; and let the other x-ing employees be women. 
Imagine, now, that the employer responds to P’s demand for a justification of 
his being singled out for his x-ing by declaring, “I am firing you and not them 
because you are a man, and they are women.” 
We may or may not be inclined to credit this unvarnished response as 
adequate from the perspective of a progressive understanding of sex or gender 
discrimination. Yet, we would surely hesitate to assert—at least as a descriptive 
claim about the current law—that the employer’s explicit appeal to P’s sex as the 
reason for treating him differently establishes ipso facto the fact of intentional 
discrimination. On the contrary, it is likely that most courts would decline to 
find actionable sex discrimination here. This implies that there are at least some 
circumstances in which an employer can legally maintain a policy under which 
certain behaviors can provide reason to take adverse action against men but not 
women, and vice versa. In other words, an employer’s differentially adverse 
treatment of one employee as compared to another can sometimes be justified 
by appeal to the employee’s sex, to the effect that—as in our hypothetical—the 
employer can take adverse action against employees of one sex for engaging in 
behavior that is deemed acceptable for employees of the other sex. 
This implication is at the same time unsurprising and deeply puzzling. It is 
unsurprising inasmuch as, at some level, one wants to say that of course current 
employment discrimination law recognizes a legally relevant difference between 
men and women in the context of regulations governing the way they present 
themselves in the workplace. Is it not stating the obvious to observe that the law 
does not require employers to ignore all social norms tied to sex? Would it not 
be an exercise in absurdity even to entertain the notion that an employer 
unlawfully discriminates against male employees by restricting their entry into 
the women’s washroom, or vice versa?3 
Yet, as appealing as this sort of deflating, bullet-biting response may be, it 
does not answer the deep—or at least nagging—question that remains. My 
simple hypothetical suggests that we cannot say, as a general rule, that an 
employee’s sex is always irrelevant to the standards of evaluation that justify the 
employment actions that affect him or her. This seems particularly evident in 
 
 2. I borrow the figure of the man in the “frilly pink dress” from Mary Anne C. Case, 
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in Law and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1995). 
 3. Boyce v. Safeway Stores, 351 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding that the defendant’s 
beard and hair-length policies, applicable only to male employees, “are not shown to discriminate on 
the basis of sex any more than a condition of employment that requires males and females to use 
separate toilet facilities, or bars males but not females from wearing skirts”); see also Dodge v. Giant 
Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: the Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000) (describing the standard view that 
regulations requiring men to dress and groom themselves differently from women “no more 
constitute discrimination ‘on the basis of sex . . . than a condition of employment that requires males 
and females to use separate toilet facilities’” (quoting Boyce, 351 F. Supp. at 403)); cf. Doe v. Boeing 
Co., 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993) (holding that employer was not required to permit gender-dysphoric 
biologically male employee to wear women’s clothing or use women’s restrooms); Goins v. W. 
Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (holding that designation of separate restrooms based on 
biological sex was not in violation of state antidiscrimination statute). 
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cases involving restrictions concerning the manner in which an employee may 
present the appearance of his or her physical body to others in the workplace. 
But if we presume that there is some legal principle that says that an employee’s 
sex can—at least as to those kinds of restrictions—determine whether a 
particular employment action is legally justified with respect to him or her, then 
how can that principle be reconciled with the general legal prohibition of 
discrimination because of sex? In other words: Suppose it is true that at least 
some differential treatment based on sex is legally permitted (regarded as non-
discriminatory) in the context of workplace restrictions on dress and physical 
appearance. Then what, if any, is the more general principle that allows us to 
distinguish action that depends on consideration of sex, or “sex-dependent” 
action, in that context from sex-dependent action that is objectionable as 
discrimination in other contexts? 
I argue that the primary doctrines of employment discrimination law do 
not themselves draw a satisfactory distinction between sex-dependent 
restrictions on dress and grooming and actions that uncontroversially qualify as 
sex discrimination in other contexts. I contend that supplementary strategies 
that courts have used to carve out such restrictions as an area of separate 
concern are either inconclusive or question-begging. I then consider whether the 
law’s seemingly sui generis approach to sex-dependent restrictions on dress and 
grooming can be explained or justified on the grounds that they do not implicate 
the main concerns of equality that the legal prohibition of sex discrimination 
might be thought to embody. I offer some observations as to what those 
concerns might be and discuss how sex-dependent restrictions on personal 
presentation in the workplace might be thought to implicate such concerns. I 
conclude with a suggestion that the justifiability of the law’s current approach to 
sex-dependent dress and grooming restrictions implies a substantive claim 
about the possibility and the positive value of preserving a social state of affairs 
in which men and women enjoy economic equality but adhere to sex-dependent 
social norms in respect of the outward presentation of their bodies to others. 
II. ON THE PROBLEM OF REDESCRIPTION 
I begin my analysis with a discussion of a persistent and thorny problem 
relating to the main issue raised by the hypothetical case presented in the 
introduction. One might argue that my characterization of the employer’s 
termination of the male employee—for wearing a frilly pink dress—as an action 
depending on consideration of sex is problematic at the outset. If my objective is 
to determine whether restrictions on personal presentation can be analyzed as 
sex discrimination, is it not impermissible question-begging to characterize the 
employer’s action in my hypothetical as sex-dependent? After all, the em-
ployer’s action could, with equal plausibility, be described as a sex-neutral 
restriction on “inappropriate attire” or as a response to indecorous behavior in 
the employer’s workplace,4 or perhaps as a sex-neutral effort to protect customer 
or client sensibilities. The objection, then, is that if I am going to construct an 
 
 4. Cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (characterizing a judge’s 
requirement that a male attorney wear a necktie as a matter of “decorous professional behavior and 
appearance” dictated by “current fashion,” which did not constitute sex discrimination). 
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argument about whether workplace restrictions on an employee’s mode of 
personal presentation constitute objectionable sex discrimination, I cannot 
simply help myself to the characterization of such restrictions as actions based 
on consideration of sex. 
This difficulty is an important one. But I regard it not so much as an 
objection to my treatment of my opening hypothetical than as an alternative 
way of stating the very same question that I seek to address in this article. It is 
surely true that the employer’s termination of our hypothetical cross-dressing 
male employee could be described in facially sex-neutral terms—e.g., as the 
enforcement of a general requirement of “appropriate” workplace attire or of 
“professional” behavior. And we might even re-imagine the original hypo-
thetical to suppose that this sex-neutral characterization could be substantiated 
with evidence that female employees had been fired for comparable infractions 
(whatever those might be).5 
I have no interest in denying the potential plausibility of these 
characterizations. The fact that an employer’s termination of a cross-dressing 
male on account of his cross-dressing can be described in alternative, facially 
sex-neutral terms does not preclude our asking whether that action constitutes 
objectionable discrimination. For however else the employer’s action might be 
described, it will remain subject to description as the firing of a male employee 
on account of his wearing a frilly pink dress. And so long as the employer 
would not regard the wearing of a frilly pink dress as a reason for firing a 
female employee, the male employee will be able to articulate a simple claim of 
differential treatment: he was terminated for an action that would not have been 
regarded as grounds for termination with respect to a female employee. Since 
this consideration was regarded as grounds for termination only because he was 
male, it follows that he was terminated because of his sex. 
I want to be clear that I do not argue that it follows from the availability of 
the sex-dependent characterization of my hypothetical employer’s action that 
the action is discriminatory. My point is that the availability of the sex-neutral 
characterization shows no more and no less than the availability of the sex-
dependent one. Let me put it another way. A skeptic might argue that since we 
do not have any reason (in the absence of further facts) to privilege the 
description of the employer’s action as a sex-dependent termination over its 
description in more neutral terms, any attempt on my part to analyze the action 
as sex discrimination will be based on a hopelessly unstable premise.6 But this 
objection misconstrues the nature of my inquiry. To repeat, I do not mean to 
suggest that the possibility of describing an action in sex-dependent terms 
 
 5. It is possible that there is nothing a female employee could do that would be precisely 
analogous to a male employee wearing a frilly pink dress. But this is beside the point of the objection 
I am considering, which is simply that the firing of a cross-dressing male could very plausibly be 
described in sex-neutral terms as the firing of an employee for wearing attire that was inappropriate 
for the workplace. 
 6. This skeptical viewpoint is related to one that has been given voice by Kimberly Yuracko. 
See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 188–98 (2004). 
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proves that the action constitutes sex discrimination.7 By the same token, 
however, the availability of a sex-neutral redescription of my hypothetical male 
employee’s termination is not necessarily preclusive of a description of that 
same action as a sex-dependent one. 
So, although one might think that an analysis of whether restrictions on 
dress and grooming constitute sex discrimination requires a threshold inquiry 
regarding how we are to adjudicate between competing sex-dependent and sex-
neutral characterizations of the same action, what I am suggesting is that such 
an inquiry is really just an alternate formulation of precisely the question that 
motivates this article. The question of how to choose between such competing 
characterizations of sex-dependent restrictions on dress and grooming is the 
same as the question of whether there exists any coherent, non-arbitrary basis 
for exempting such restrictions from the ambit of objectionable sex 
discrimination. 
III. TWO DEFINITIONS 
In the interest of avoiding potentially tendentious characterizations, I begin 
my analysis by offering a pair of definitions. In this article, I shall use the term 
“sex-dependent workplace restriction” to refer to workplace requirements or 
proscriptions, however they might be characterized, whose application or 
enforcement with regard to a particular employee is predicated on, or cannot be 
determined without consideration of, that employee’s sex.8 Thus, for example, a 
restriction that specifically instructed all and only female employees to conform 
to a certain dress requirement would obviously be a sex-dependent restriction. 
A policy that required all employees to wear “appropriate business attire” might 
also be a sex-dependent restriction to the extent that determinations of what was 
“appropriate” depended upon consideration of the sex of the subject employee. 
A policy that required all employees to wear a hat would be a sex-independent 
restriction. A requirement that short-haired employees wear caps while long-
haired employees wear hair nets would also be sex-independent—even if, as a 
practical matter, this meant that the hair-net requirement applied only to female 
employees.9 Similarly, an appearance code requiring all employees to keep their 
beards trimmed would be a sex-independent restriction, not a sex-dependent 
one, even though (presumably) it would affect only male employees, because its 
application to any employee would not require consideration of that employee’s 
sex. 
 
 7. Indeed, I do not even suggest that the particular action described in my opening 
hypothetical should necessarily be regarded as objectionably discriminatory. 
 8. I prefer the term “sex-dependent” to the phrase “sex-differentiated” just because it seems to 
more naturally encompass not only those restrictions that are explicitly formulated in sex-
differentiated terms, but also those restrictions that might be given a neutral formulation but whose 
application is still predicated on consideration of sex. Nothing of substance, however, should be 
thought to turn on my choice of terminology. 
 9. If we varied the facts a bit such that it turned out that the requirement, although sex-
independent on its face, was actually applied in practice such that only women with long hair were 
required to wear hair nets while men with long hair were permitted to wear caps, then the 
requirement would be a sex-dependent one under my nomenclature, insofar as its actual application 
was predicated on the subject employee’s sex. 
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Second, I shall use the locution “workplace restriction on personal 
presentation” to refer to employment requirements and policies that restrict the 
manner in which an employee is permitted to present the surface of his or her 
face, head, hair, and body to others in the workplace. Thus, restrictions on 
personal presentation include all policies that traditionally are grouped under 
the rubric of “appearance standards” or regulations regarding “dress and 
grooming,” such as policies governing workplace attire, uniforms, hair length, 
beards, jewelry, makeup and cosmetics, and so on.10 
IV. INTENTIONALITY 
Current employment discrimination law already provides a test that 
determines when an action that is susceptible to alternative characterizations 
should be regarded, for legal purposes, as differential treatment “because of” 
one of the factors that is excluded from consideration by Title VII, including 
sex.11 We must view the action as discriminatory, even if a non-discriminatory 
characterization of the action is possible, when a forbidden consideration forms 
part of the intention or motivation of the actor who is alleged to have acted 
discriminatorily.12 One might argue, therefore, that there is a perfectly 
straightforward way of deciding whether the employer in my opening 
hypothetical engaged in sex discrimination: If the employer acted with a 
discriminatory motive or intent, then we should regard the termination of the 
cross-dressing male employee as discriminatory. However, if the employer 
acted with no such motive or intent, then we should regard the termination as a 
non-discriminatory enforcement of a workplace dress code (“appropriate attire 
required”) that applies equally to men and women alike. 
To be sure, there is no denying that, under current approaches, the 
intention of the alleged discriminator is the nominal focus of the legal inquiry, at 
least in a disparate treatment action.13 But if our purpose is to work toward a 
 
 10. Policies that speak to a person’s build, stature, or physical conditioning—such as height and 
weight restrictions or strength and endurance requirements—do not fall under my definition of 
restrictions on personal presentation. I separate the latter restrictions from the former because they 
do seem to me to be of a slightly different character, which is not to say they are any more or less 
objectionable. By and large, however, I think that my analysis with regard to restrictions on personal 
presentation will apply equally to restrictions on physical build, stature, and conditioning. And 
indeed, I treat some of the case law regarding the analysis of such restrictions under the 
discrimination laws as directly relevant to the proper treatment of restrictions on personal 
presentation. 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 12. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (“The ‘factual 
inquiry’ in a Title VII case is ‘whether [sic] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff.’” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))). 
 13. See Id. Of course, even under current approaches, the intent of the alleged discriminator is 
not the focus of inquiry in disparate impact cases arising under Section 703(k)(1) of Title VII, which 
permits a plaintiff to establish discrimination by proving that the employment practice in question 
unjustifiably created differentially adverse burdens as between men and women. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000); see generally Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert 
Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 953–67 (2005) (explaining the distinction between claims 
of disparate impact and disparate treatment). However, as I explained above, the question 
underlying the inquiry of this paper is whether, or in what circumstances, restrictions on personal 
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theoretical understanding of how to analyze sex-dependent workplace 
restrictions on personal presentation under the employment discrimination 
laws, to say that the classification of a particular presentational restriction as 
discriminatory or non-discriminatory depends on the employer’s intent is like 
saying that negligence liability depends on the defendant’s fault, or that criminal 
liability depends on mens rea. Accepting the truth of the general proposition 
does not help us move toward an understanding of the specific considerations 
that are relevant to the requisite analysis. 
Suppose, for example, that my original hypothetical employer, after firing a 
male employee for wearing a frilly pink dress, were to concede that the decision 
to terminate the employee was motivated by a belief that it is inappropriate for 
men to wear dresses to work, and that it was relevant to—indeed, dispositive 
of—the termination decision that the employee was in fact a man. Would these 
admissions be sufficient to establish that the employer acted on a discriminatory 
motive? 
If the answer were yes, it would be difficult to see how we could possibly 
avoid the conclusion that all adverse employment actions based on sex-
dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation constitute sex 
discrimination. For in every case in which adverse action is taken against a male 
(or female) employee on the basis of a judgment that the employee’s personal 
presentation was inappropriate for a man (or woman) in the relevant workplace, 
it will be trivially true that the employer’s action will have been based on an 
explicit consideration of the employee’s sex. It will also be true that the 
employer would not have taken that same action if the employee’s sex had not 
been taken into account.14 This, arguably, would be sufficient to satisfy common 
formulations of what it means to act on a discriminatory motive15 and hence for 
an action to be characterizable as prima facie discrimination.16 Yet, under current 
legal approaches, it is simply not the case that all sex-dependent restrictions on 
personal presentation constitute sex discrimination.17 
 
presentation whose conditions of compliance are different for men and women should be analyzed 
as disparate treatment “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 14. In my original hypothetical, the employee presumably would not have been fired for 
wearing a frilly pink dress if the employer had ignored the fact that the employee was male. Of 
course, “but for” causation will not be present in cases where an employee is fired for conduct that 
would have been equally inappropriate for an employee of the opposite sex. In such cases, however, 
the action in question would not be based on a sex-dependent restriction or policy, by definition. 
 15. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (stating, in the context of a mixed 
motives case, that proof of non-discriminatory motive requires showing that the employer “would 
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account”). 
 16. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 73 F.3d 128, 131–32 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing 
that proof of the employer’s “open and explicit use of gender” as a basis for action is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination). 
 17. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(“We have long recognized that companies may differentiate between men and women in 
appearance and grooming policies, and so have other circuits.”). 
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Thus, if we hold fixed the proposition that adverse employment actions 
done with discriminatory intent constitute discrimination,18 then it would 
appear to follow—as a matter of positive law—that explicitly taking into 
account an employee’s sex for purposes of making a judgment about the 
workplace-appropriateness of his or her mode of personal presentation does not 
necessarily constitute discriminatory intent or motive. But if express 
consideration of an employee’s sex as part of the basis for taking adverse action 
against him or her does not constitute discriminatory intent or motive, then it 
becomes unclear what does.19 
What becomes apparent, instead, is that the notion of “discriminatory 
intent” in this context is itself a notion that is in need of explanation, and not one 
that can explain the permissibility of sex-dependent restrictions on personal 
presentation. In other words, even assuming that discriminatory intent has some 
discernible, independent meaning20 in this context, it is going to take some 
theoretical work to flesh out the content of that notion and to justify its relevance 
to the determination of sex discrimination vel non. Certainly, the notion of 
discriminatory intent in this context is too opaque to help us distinguish 
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory sex-dependent restrictions on 
personal presentation. It explains nothing to say that such a restriction should be 
regarded as an objectionably discriminatory policy, rather than a neutral one, 
whenever its enforcement involves an intent to discriminate. 
V. STEREOTYPING 
Courts often say that it constitutes impermissible sex discrimination to take 
adverse action against an employee on the basis of impermissible sex or gender 
 
 18. Even recent cases upholding sex-dependent presentational restrictions against sex 
discrimination challenges have stated that proof of discriminatory intent is sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case. See, e.g., Id. at 1109. 
 19. The question becomes even more puzzling if we consider how the legal assessment of 
discriminatory intent might change in a case that presented an analogous question concerning 
discrimination on the basis of race, rather than sex. Imagine, for example, that instead of firing the 
male employee for wearing a frilly pink dress, my hypothetical employer had fired an Asian 
employee for dying his hair blond, while not taking any action against non-Asian employees who 
had exhibited the same behavior. The employer claims that the termination was based on a race 
neutral requirement that all employees maintain a professional and business-like appearance in the 
workplace. Now, if the employer were to concede that the termination was motivated by a belief that 
it is unprofessional for Asians to wear blonde hair in the workplace, and that it was relevant to the 
termination decision that this employee was in fact Asian, how might we suppose a court would 
come out on the question whether there remained a genuine issue of discriminatory intent? I would 
think that the employer’s admissions should establish discriminatory intent beyond peradventure. 
Cf. Post, supra note 3, at 34 (expressing a “strong[] susp[icion]” that every court would regard as 
discriminatory “a grooming code that require[d] blacks, but not whites, to have short hair” 
(alterations added)). And I would think so, despite at least one court’s apparent conclusion to the 
contrary. See Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel, No. Civ.A.99-3891, 2000 WL 1610775 (E.D. La. 2000) 
(finding no racial discrimination where employer prohibited African-American woman from 
wearing blonde hair). 
 20. The more likely story, I believe, is that acting on discriminatory intent in this particular 
context has no meaning other than acting on the basis of considerations that are legally unfit to 
justify the employment action in question. Obviously, if this is the case, then the notion of 
discriminatory intent is completely derivative of the substantive question of justification. 
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stereotypes.21 I argue in this section that the prevailing attitude of tolerance with 
regard to certain sex-dependent restrictions on dress and grooming is difficult to 
square with the general prohibition of stereotyping discrimination, at least 
under one of two alternative understandings of that concept. 
I find it helpful to distinguish between two different kinds of behavior that 
seem to fall under the rubric of stereotyping, which I will refer to as (1) 
prescriptive stereotyping and (2) epistemic stereotyping.22 Prescriptive 
stereotyping on the basis of a protected group classification (race, sex, national 
origin, etc.) occurs when an agent acts adversely23 toward an individual or set of 
individuals on the basis of a judgment that the individual’s behavior is 
inappropriate, socially unacceptable, or disfavored in virtue of the individual’s 
membership (or apparent membership) in the group defined by that 
classification.24 Thus, an employer engages in prescriptive stereotyping when, 
for example, the employer’s refusal to promote a female employee is motivated 
by a judgment that her aggressive personality is inappropriate for a woman,25 or 
(at least in the Sixth Circuit) when the employer’s adverse action against a male 
employee is rooted in a judgment that his manner is too “effeminate.”26 
Epistemic stereotyping on the basis of a protected group classification occurs 
when an agent acts27 based on an unreasonable belief28 about an individual’s 
 
 21. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (plurality opinion); 
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111; Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2004); Craft v. 
Metromedia, Inc.¸ 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1985); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 22. A similar distinction has been drawn by Professors Carbado, Gulati, and Ramachandran. 
See Devon Carbado, G. Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, Makeup and Women at Work, in 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 140–44 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006). Likewise, Anthony 
Appiah has distinguished between “statistical stereotypes,” “false [belief] stereotypes,” and 
“normative stereotypes.” See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 41, 48–49 (2000). For Appiah, statistical and false stereotypes “involve intellectual error—either 
misunderstanding the facts . . . or misunderstanding their relevance,” while “there is no reason to 
suppose that normative stereotypes as such must be wrong, or that public actions grounded on them 
are to be criticized.” Id. at 49. 
 23. Some might want to say that it is possible for an actor to engage in stereotyping by adopting 
a certain belief or harboring an attitude without taking action. I have no objection to such a view but 
limit my discussion of stereotyping to cases of action, since employment discrimination claims 
necessarily presuppose adverse action. 
 24. One might broaden my definition of prescriptive stereotyping actions to include actions that 
are beneficial to an individual when such actions are based on a judgment that the individual’s 
behavior is socially exemplary in virtue of the individual’s membership in some protected group. I 
would have no objection to this broadened definition. For purposes of this article, however, I use 
“prescriptive stereotyping” to refer primarily to adverse employment action. 
 25. Cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. Notice that an employer can act on a judgment that an 
employee’s behavior is inappropriate, but not inappropriate in virtue of the employee’s membership 
in any particular class. Thus, an employer who fires a female employee for having an aggressive 
personality does not engage in what I am referring to as prescriptive stereotyping if the employer’s 
action was based on a judgment that the employee’s behavior was inappropriate in virtue of the 
nature of her job (say, customer service) and not because she is a woman. 
 26. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–73; see also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 
2005) (following Smith). 
 27. Again, it might be better to allow that the adoption of a belief or attitude might constitute 
epistemic stereotyping. My limitation of stereotyping to cases of action simply reflects the legal 
requirement of adverse action as an element of a discrimination claim. 
16__SHIN.DOC 2/8/2007 2:09 PM 
500 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:491 2007 
attributes that is predicated on that individual’s membership in that protected 
group. An example of epistemic stereotyping is an employer who refuses to hire 
women to do a particular job based on a belief that, say, men generally work 
harder than women.29 Thus, whereas prescriptive stereotyping based on a group 
classification involves acting in a way that expresses disapproval of an 
individual’s failure to conform to certain expectations about how members of 
that group should behave (or about what behavior is appropriate for them),30 
epistemic stereotyping involves acting on a belief based on the inferred 
attribution of some matter of fact to members of that group because of their 
membership in that group.31 
Do sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation—such as a 
proscription against male cross-dressing or a requirement that women wear 
makeup—involve stereotyping in either the prescriptive or epistemic sense? The 
most natural answer is that such restrictions do not generally involve 
stereotyping in the epistemic sense but do involve stereotyping in the 
prescriptive sense. I believe, however, that they can involve stereotyping in both 
senses. 
The case for prescriptive stereotyping is straightforward. Consider again 
my hypothetical case of the cross-dressing male employee. Assume that the 
employee’s termination was based on a judgment that it was inappropriate for 
him to be wearing women’s clothing in the workplace. We presume that the 
employer would not have come to that judgment if the employee had been a 
woman; the employer would not have thought it inappropriate for a female 
employee to wear that identical attire in the same workplace. The termination of 
the cross-dressing male employee thus seems clearly predicated on a judgment 
that his behavior was socially inappropriate because he was male.32 It follows 
from my definition that the employer’s action in that hypothetical case 
constitutes prescriptive stereotyping. A similar account could be given of 
 
 28. Some may disagree with my decision to define epistemic stereotyping as unreasonable. This 
definition seems to me consistent, however, with the common legal usage of the term in the sense I 
am trying to identify. An alternative to my approach would be to define epistemic stereotyping in 
more neutral terms and then distinguish as necessary between reasonable epistemic stereotyping 
and unreasonable epistemic stereotyping. Once again, nothing of substance should be thought to 
turn on this terminological choice. 
 29. Cf. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment 
Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 353–54 (1980) (reviewing social science research showing how 
generalizations about women’s abilities and capacities can affect hiring and promotion decisions). 
 30. Here, my understanding of “prescriptive stereotyping” departs significantly from Appiah’s 
understanding of action based on a “normative stereotype.” See Appiah, supra note 22, at 49. 
 31. Some instances of discrimination might involve stereotyping in both the prescriptive and 
epistemic senses. An example of such double-barreled stereotyping might be the hiring of a man 
over a woman for a job requiring long hours on the basis of a belief that it is socially preferable that 
women maximize the amount of time they spend at home supporting their families, and that familial 
obligations would make it difficult for women to put in an extended work day. Cf. BOB WOODWARD 
& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 123 (Simon & Schuster 1979) (recounting story of Chief Justice 
Burger’s explanation to his law clerks of why he refused to hire a female clerk); see also MICHAEL J. 
ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 82–83 (6th ed. 2003) (quoting same). 
 32. Cf. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 
2002). 
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Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,33 in which a female employee was terminated 
for refusing to wear makeup.34 There, the employee’s termination was based on 
her violation of a sex-dependent requirement governing the presentation of 
female employees in the workplace. Insofar as that requirement was based on a 
judgment that it is socially unacceptable for women not to wear makeup (or 
socially preferable that they do), the termination in that case could be regarded 
as based on a judgment that the employee’s behavior was socially unacceptable 
or disfavored because she was a woman.35 In any event, it should be clear that 
many sex-dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation—and most 
particularly, those that reinforce or are parasitic on social conventions of gender 
performance—will involve prescriptive stereotyping.36 
It is less clear whether such restrictions generally involve what I have 
referred to as epistemic stereotyping. One might plausibly argue that 
employment actions taken on the basis of such restrictions tend to be based on 
dubious or at least debatable factual premises. For example, a common rationale 
for the enforcement of such restrictions is that they are important to the 
company’s public image and are, thus, a matter of business necessity. But courts 
passing on the permissibility of garden-variety restrictions on employee dress 
and grooming—such as attire or hair-length requirements—have typically been 
willing to accept an employer’s say-so as to the business-relevance of the 
restrictions in question.37 One wonders what sort of empirical evidence there 
really could be for a belief that a company’s business reputation could be 
materially affected in one way or another by whether its female employees keep 
their fingernails a certain length or style their hair in a certain way.38 
But a policy that has a bad factual basis is not necessarily a policy that relies 
on sex stereotypes. In order to conclude that sex-dependent dress and grooming 
requirements depend as a general matter on epistemic sex stereotypes, we 
would have to say that such requirements are based on the epistemically 
unreasonable attribution of some trait or characteristic to particular individuals 
in virtue of their being male or female. 
 
 33. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 34. I discuss the Jespersen case in fuller detail below. 
 35. Even if the employer did not consciously hold a view that it was socially undesirable for 
women not to wear makeup, the employer’s action could still constitute prescriptive stereotyping (as 
I have defined it) if the action could be causally traced to an unconscious bias that was itself rooted 
in a social preference that women wear makeup. Cf. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59–
61 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that acting on subtle, even unconscious, cognitive biases can constitute 
discriminatory stereotyping in violation of Title VII). 
 36. On the other hand, it should also be clear that sex-dependent restrictions that are more 
idiosyncratic in nature—imagine, for example, a requirement that male employees wear green shirts 
while female employees wear blue shirts—might not involve prescriptive stereotyping at all. 
 37. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979); 
Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 38. See Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124–25 (taking “judicial notice” of the importance of employee 
appearance to a company’s public image); see also Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1031 n.15 (expressing 
reluctance to second-guess an employer’s business needs with regard to regulating employee 
appearance). But cf. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting district 
court’s finding that termination of female news anchor had been based in part on results of a viewer 
survey concerning the anchor’s appearance). 
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The employer who insists on sex-dependent restrictions on personal 
presentation in the workplace may hold a variety of beliefs, including 
unreasonable ones, about the attributes of men and women who violate those 
restrictions. More specifically, the employer may hold beliefs based on 
inferences from heterodox gender behavior to negative conclusions about the 
character, traits, capacities, and fitness for employment of those who engage in 
such behavior. An employer might believe, for example, that employees who 
engage in cross-dressing or otherwise refuse to perform their gender in an 
orthodox way are employees who are generally prone to violating rules, being 
disruptive, defying authority,39 or more broadly, do not share the community’s 
sense of what is reasonable.40 To the extent that such inferences are warrantless, 
attitudes and actions that depend upon them will be open to serious objection.41  
When I first began to think about this issue, the objection most directly 
relevant to these sorts of inferences seemed different from the objection to 
epistemic sex stereotyping. It seemed to me that if an employer fires a man for 
wearing a dress to work based on the belief that men who wear dresses are 
prone to defy managerial authority, the relevant objection would be that the 
action may be predicated on an unsound inference about men who wear 
dresses, not that it entails any epistemically unreasonable beliefs about men in 
general. On that basis, my initial skeptical view was that we should say that the 
action might involve epistemic stereotyping of men-who-wear-dresses, but not 
epistemic stereotyping of men in general, and it is only the latter kind of 
stereotyping that implicates the prohibition against sex discrimination.42 
 
 39. Cf. Catherine Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance 
Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2006) (observing that “when an 
employer insists upon conformity, the struggle quickly becomes as much about maintaining 
discipline and controlling deviance as it is about enforcing particular norms of . . . gender”). 
 40. Note the distinction between firing a cross-dressing man on the grounds that cross-dressing 
is disruptive to the workplace and firing a cross-dressing man on the grounds that a man who cross-
dresses is likely to engage in (other) disruptive behavior. Cf. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
566 F.2d 659, 661 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (reporting employer’s claim that “transitional” male-to-female 
transsexual’s choice of women’s clothing and makeup was “very disruptive” and “embarrassing to 
all concerned”). The present discussion concerns how we should think about the latter kind of 
inference. Obviously, however, if courts were to hold that it constitutes sex discrimination to take 
adverse action against a man for wearing women’s clothing, such action presumably could not then 
be indirectly justified on a rationale that cross-dressing behavior would be disruptive or 
“embarrassing.” 
 41. I think that these inferences could be objectionable in at least two ways. First, they might 
simply be empirically unfounded. For instance, there might be no correlation at all between 
choosing an unconventional mode of personal presentation and any other aspect of an individual’s 
values or attitudes toward rules and authority. Second, there is a certain circularity in drawing 
inferences that support adverse employment action against an individual from the fact that the 
individual violated restrictions relating to dress and grooming, since the permissibility of such 
restrictions is precisely the issue under investigation. If we were to conclude that sex-dependent 
restrictions on dress and grooming based on conventional social norms are impermissible, we would 
presumably want to regard as illegitimate the drawing of negative inferences about an individual’s 
fitness for employment from the fact that the individual violated such norms. 
 42. In the specific case of male cross-dressing, employers might tend to see that behavior as an 
epistemic proxy for being gay or transsexual, in which case the termination of male employees for 
cross-dressing might fairly be considered tantamount to actions motivated by a sexual-orientation 
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On further reflection, however, it seemed to me that my initial skeptical 
view suffered from essentially the same error that I charged to the strategy of 
“redescription” described earlier.43 The skeptical claim—namely, that sex-
dependent restrictions on personal presentation do not involve epistemic sex 
stereotyping because such restrictions rest on beliefs about individuals who 
engage in unconventional behavior, not beliefs about men or women in 
general—is not much different from the claim that firing a male employee for 
wearing a dress is not sex discrimination because it is based on a judgment 
about the appropriateness of men-in-dresses, not about men in general. 
My rejection of the latter claim cannot be consistent with my acceptance of 
the former. I said that the characterizability of a sex-dependent restriction in 
neutral terms does not settle the question whether the restriction is 
objectionable, because (by definition of a sex-dependent restriction) it will 
necessarily also remain characterizable as being predicated on consideration of 
sex.44 Similarly, even accepting that employers who enforce conventional sex-
dependent restrictions on dress or grooming may typically do so on the basis of 
a belief that individuals who defy such conventions tend to have a problem with 
accepting authority (or are otherwise unfit for employment), the relevant 
question is whether the belief that P is unfit for employment by virtue of 
behavior x depends upon consideration of P’s sex. And it is clear that it does. 
That is, it may be true that the employer who fires the male employee for 
wearing a dress does so due to a belief that such individuals have trouble 
accepting authority; but that belief is nevertheless predicated on the fact of the 
employee’s sex, assuming that the employer does not hold the same belief about 
female employees who wear dresses. I make no claim here that sex-dependent 
restrictions always depend upon unreasonable beliefs about individuals who 
defy conventional social norms governing how they present themselves to 
others.45 The conclusion I draw is that to the extent that they do, they should be 
recognized as objectionable on the grounds of epistemic sex stereotyping. 
In summary, sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation—
particularly those that reinforce or piggyback on social conventions of gender—
 
based animus. Cf. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Penn. 1993) 
(attempting to distinguish between sex discrimination and discrimination based on transsexuality). 
 43. See supra Part II. 
 44. My conclusion, to reiterate, was that the question whether sex-dependent restrictions are 
discriminatory cannot adequately be resolved by simply choosing one redescriptive strategy over 
another. 
 45. I believe that the question whether such beliefs are reasonable or unreasonable will be 
inextricably linked to the question of whether the law should regard sex-dependent restrictions as 
discriminatory. If we conclude that sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation should 
constitute sex discrimination, then we would probably also conclude that there is good reason to 
regard as legally illegitimate any drawing of inferences running from the fact of behavior that would 
violate such restrictions to conclusions about an individual’s character or fitness for employment. In 
other words, if it constitutes sex discrimination to fire a man for wearing a dress, then it should also 
constitute sex discrimination to use the fact of such conduct as a proxy for other attributes rendering 
him unfit for employment. On the other hand, if we think that firing a man for wearing a dress does 
not constitute sex discrimination, we have no more reason to legally proscribe acting on 
unreasonable inferences running from such conduct than we would have to proscribe acting on 
unreasonable inferences in general. 
16__SHIN.DOC 2/8/2007 2:09 PM 
504 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:491 2007 
do seem to involve sex stereotyping in the prescriptive sense and may also 
involve sex stereotyping in the epistemic sense. But, if adverse employment 
actions based on sex stereotyping constitute sex discrimination under current 
antidiscrimination law, we seem to be even farther than when we started from 
an answer to the question under investigation: how is it possible that sex-
dependent restrictions on personal presentation do not at least presumptively 
constitute impermissible sex discrimination? 
VI. THE UNEQUAL BURDENS ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit has recently held that sex discrimination challenges to 
workplace restrictions on personal presentation depend upon a determination of 
whether the restrictions at issue create “unequal burdens” as between the men 
and women to whom they apply.46 More specifically, under the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, a plaintiff can establish that a sex-dependent restriction constitutes 
sex discrimination only by demonstrating that it imposes an unequal, greater 
burden for members of the plaintiff’s sex.47 Moreover, according to the Jespersen 
court, proof of unequal burdens is a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case, not 
merely evidence that could be incrementally probative of discrimination.48 In 
this section, I consider whether the Ninth Circuit’s unequal burdens approach 
provides an adequate answer to the question whether sex-dependent restrictions 
on personal presentation constitute sex discrimination. 
The basic problem with the unequal burdens test is in providing a non-
circular account of the relevance of this analysis.49 First, we must bear in mind 
 
 46. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 47. See id. at 1110. 
 48. See id. at 1111 (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds that plaintiff 
had “failed to create a record establishing that [the grooming restrictions at issue were] more 
burdensome for women than for men”); see also Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 
(D.D.C. 2006) (discussing and following Jespersen). 
 49. The three cases cited by the Jespersen court in support of its invocation of the unequal 
burdens test are Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 914 
(2001), Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982), and Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977). It is not completely obvious that any of those cases provides 
unequivocal support for Jespersen’s understanding of the unequal burdens test. The language in 
Gerdom that arguably supports that understanding is clearly dicta, insofar as the allegedly 
discriminatory restriction in that case (a maximum weight requirement for flight attendants) was 
applied exclusively to female employees, see Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 605, and hence was held to be 
discriminatory on its face, see id. at 608. In Frank, which involved a policy enforcing maximum 
weight requirements for flight attendants that were different for men and women, the court stated 
that “[a]n appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and 
women is not disparate treatment,” Frank, 216 F.3d at 854 (alteration added), but after assuming 
arguendo that the differential weight requirements could be regarded as an “appearance standard,” 
the court held that the weight standards at issue were themselves differentially burdensome on their 
face, see id. at 855, and left open the question whether the very fact that there were separate 
standards for men and women could establish discriminatory treatment, see id. Finally, in Fountain, 
the court held that it was not sex discrimination for the defendant to insist that the male plaintiff don 
a necktie even though it had waived similar requirements for its female employees, see Fountain, 555 
F.2d at 755–56, but the court seemed to ground its decision on an expansive view of an employer’s 
prerogative to maintain separate dress and grooming requirements in accordance with “what its 
particular business requires,” id. at 756. Thus, although there may have been hints of the approach in 
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that the Jespersen court invoked the unequal burdens test to evaluate a basic 
claim of disparate treatment under section 703(a) of Title VII,50 not a claim of 
disparate impact under section 703(k).51 The claim that I have been attempting to 
analyze is that such restrictions are objectionably discriminatory because they 
impose standards of evaluation that are directly dependent upon consideration 
of sex—and not primarily because such standards have differentially adverse 
consequences as applied. 
But if the issue is whether sex-dependent dress and grooming codes 
constitute discrimination within the disparate treatment paradigm, how could 
the unequal burdens test be relevant at all? If we assume that a challenged 
restriction involves intentionally adverse treatment on the basis of sex,52 then 
proof of unequal burden should be unnecessary, because a claim of intentionally 
differential treatment does not ordinarily depend upon evidence of differentially 
 
Fountain, Gerdom, and Frank, the unequal burdens test was not doctrinally crystallized until the en 
banc majority’s opinion in Jespersen. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2000). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(k) (2000). 
The plaintiff herself clearly intended to assert a disparate treatment claim. See Reply Brief of 
Appellant Darlene Jespersen at 4, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, No. 03-
15045 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003) (“This is a classic Title VII case about the firing of a high-performing, 
long-term female employee based on a burdensome appearance rule that required only women to 
wear makeup.”), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/360. 
pdf. The court’s understanding of the claim as invoking a disparate treatment theory is evidenced by 
its citation of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) as setting forth the requirements 
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108–09. It is arguable, furthermore, that a 
disparate impact analysis would fundamentally misconceive the charge of discrimination that is 
most immediately relevant to sex-dependent dress and grooming codes. See Zahorik v. Cornell 
Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The disparate impact theory has been used mainly in the 
context of quantifiable or objectively verifiable selection criteria which are mechanically applied and 
have consequences roughly equivalent to results obtaining under systematic discrimination.” (citing, 
inter alia, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 
(1977)); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing 
between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims). Cf. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 91, 138 (2003) (arguing that disparate impact theory “conceptualizes discrimination solely at the 
institutional level” and that it tries to limit racial or gender stratification by “reducing employer 
reliance on practices that have an unintended adverse and unnecessary effect on particular groups”); 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995) (arguing that courts have used 
disparate impact theory to address issues properly labeled disparate treatment). But cf. Sullivan, 
supra note 13, at 968 (disagreeing with Krieger and Green). 
Indeed, it is doubtful whether a plaintiff challenging an adverse employment action arising out of 
a voluntary refusal to comply with an employer’s dress or grooming policy could state a legally 
viable claim of disparate impact at all, at least in some jurisdictions. See Lanning v. Se. Penn. Transp. 
Auth., 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a physical conditioning requirement that disad-
vantaged female applicants did not constitute disparate impact, where most female applicants 
would be able to meet the requirement with a moderate amount of training). But see Sullivan, supra 
note 13, at 971–72 (asserting that the so-called “volitional exception” to disparate impact is “scarcely 
well established”). 
 52. As discussed above, sex-dependent restrictions on dress and grooming necessarily involve 
action that is “motivated,” at least in part, by the sex of the employees to whom they apply. 
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burdensome consequences.53 On the other hand, if we assume that the 
challenged restriction does not involve treatment that is based on sex, then 
evidence of unequal burdens should be entirely immaterial, because absent 
proof that the differential treatment in question was intentionally made to 
depend on sex, there can be no claim of discrimination under a disparate 
treatment theory.54 In either case, the question of unequal burdens seems entirely 
beside the point. It has the character of a doctrine invented to deal with a 
category of restrictions that are presupposed as requiring sui generis treatment. 
But, of course, whether sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation 
really ought to be treated as sui generis is an aspect of the very question under 
investigation! 
This difficulty is worth some elaboration. The unequal burdens test 
effectively creates a rule under which sex-dependent restrictions on personal 
presentation are to be regarded as non-discriminatory in the absence of proof 
that the challenged restrictions create different burdens as between men and 
women. This means that even if an adverse action against an employee is 
directly predicated upon the employee’s being a man or woman, we are not 
justified in classifying that action as “because of” sex unless the action’s 
consequences are more burdensome for one sex than the other. So, for example, 
even though our original hypothetical employer’s decision to fire the male 
employee for wearing the frilly pink dress was undisputedly predicated upon 
consideration of the employee’s sex, under the unequal burdens approach, we 
cannot regard that decision as differential treatment based on sex unless we can 
first establish that the policy under which the employer’s action was taken is 
more burdensome for men than for women. 
The problem lies in stating a coherent basis for this gloss on the definition 
of disparate treatment without begging the central question under investigation: 
how is it possible that sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation do 
not constitute objectionable discrimination based on sex? Ordinarily—that is, 
outside the context of matters relating to dress and grooming—if an adverse 
employment action against an employee is the result of a policy that expressly 
sets different standards for men and women, then the action is prima facie 
discriminatory,55 and the only question that remains is whether the action or 
policy is nevertheless justifiable as a bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ).56 Indeed, even in the absence of an expressly sex-dependent policy, the 
 
 53. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An employer’s policy 
amounts to disparate treatment if it treats men and women differently on its face.”); see id. at 854 n.9 
(stating that there was no need to reach plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim, because defendant’s 
policy was facially discriminatory and hence plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on a 
theory of disparate treatment). 
 54. In other words, proof that a sex-independent grooming or appearance restriction creates 
unequal burdens would not, as a general rule, suffice to establish that the restriction was prima facie 
discriminatory. 
 55. See Frank, 216 F.3d at 853; see also Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 
(3d Cir. 1996) (“When open and explicit use of gender is employed . . . discrimination is in effect 
‘admitted’ by the employer . . . .”). 
 56. Frank, 216 F.3d at 853–54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000) (setting forth the BFOQ 
exception). 
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dispositive question for liability under a Title VII disparate treatment claim is 
whether the employer’s action was based (at least in part) on consideration of 
the employee’s sex.57 Proof of facts giving rise to such an inference suffices to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.58 Certainly, it is not usually the 
case—outside the context of challenges to restrictions on personal 
presentation—that an employer could avoid disparate treatment liability by 
admitting that it subjected male and female employees to differentially adverse 
workplace requirements and then calling upon the plaintiff to prove that the 
different requirements created burdens of unequal magnitude (under some 
undefined metric) as between men and women. Yet this is precisely the 
justificatory strategy that the unequal burdens test seems to endorse in the 
context of employer restrictions on personal presentation. 
Let us take a closer look at Jespersen.59 The case involved a set of sex-
dependent restrictions on personal presentation—the “Personal Best” policy60—
that applied to various beverage servers and bartenders employed by Harrah’s 
Casino.61 The policy required, inter alia, that women wear “eye and facial 
makeup,”62 style their hair in a particular way, and wear nail polish,63 while it 
required men to wear their hair short and prohibited the wearing of facial 
makeup, “faddish hairstyles,” or colored nail polish.64 Jespersen’s objection to 
Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy was that the requirement that women wear 
makeup65 was itself prima facie discriminatory because it applied only to 
women.66 It was not disputed that, under the policy, whether an employee’s 
failure to wear makeup provided the basis for adverse employment action was 
predicated solely and expressly upon the employee’s sex. Yet, characterizing the 
casino’s sex-dependent requirements as being part of “an appearance policy that 
applied to both male and female bartenders [that] was aimed at creating a 
professional and very similar look for all of them,” the Jespersen majority 
asserted that the “material issue” was whether the policy as a whole was more 
 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice . . . .”). For purposes of simplifying discussion, I set aside the question of whether the 
“motivating factor” test of discrimination applies in cases that do not involve “mixed motives.” See 
Sullivan, supra note 13, at 933–34. 
 58. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 56–57 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining the plaintiff’s 
burden); see generally Sullivan, supra note 13, at 925–33. 
 59. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 60. See id. at 1107 (describing the program). 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The makeup policy applicable to female employees provided as follows: “Make up (face 
powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary [sic] colors. Lip 
color must be worn at all times.” Id. (quoting from the policy) (emphasis omitted). The policy 
applicable to male employees, on the other hand, stated: “Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.” 
Id. 
 66. See id. at 1109 (“. . . Jespersen argues that the makeup requirement itself establishes a prima 
facie case of discriminatory intent . . . .”). 
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burdensome for women than for men.67 Then, noting that Jespersen had failed to 
provide any evidence supporting such a conclusion (e.g., “evidence of the 
relative cost and time required to comply with the grooming requirements by 
men and women”68), the court upheld the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the casino on the question of whether the Personal Best program 
imposed unequal burdens on women.69 
The sui generis character of the equal burdens approach to workplace 
restrictions on personal presentation becomes obvious when we consider how 
absurd it would be to apply that test in other contexts. Suppose, for example, 
that a plaintiff brought a disparate treatment challenge to her employer’s 
practice of firing female employees who failed to arrive at work by 8 a.m., but 
not taking the same action as to male employees who arrived comparably late. I 
do not want to deny that a court might be justified in holding that, without 
further evidence, the fact that only women were fired for arriving at work after 8 
a.m. would be insufficient to create a triable issue of discrimination. The 
employer might have had reasons for the ostensibly differential treatment that 
had nothing to do with the sex of the employees who were fired. If, however, 
the employer admitted that it had a policy of firing all and only female 
employees who arrived at work after 8 a.m., that would surely be sufficient to 
establish that the plaintiff’s termination for arriving at work after 8 a.m. was in 
turn predicated upon her sex and therefore prima facie discriminatory.70 And 
would it not be absurd for the employer to rebut the claim of discrimination by 
asserting that the 8 a.m. arrival requirement for women was part of a general 
“Personal Punctuality” program that applied to all employees and that this 
program also required all and only male employees to stay at work until 6 p.m.? 
Furthermore, even if the employer really did maintain a separate 6 p.m. 
departure policy that was applicable only to male employees, any issue as to 
whether the burdens created by the dual policies were greater for women than 
men would strike me plainly as irrelevant. The plaintiff’s complaint, after all, is 
that the 8 a.m. arrival requirement is itself discriminatory, not that the “Personal 
Punctuality” program as a whole is discriminatory.71 Yet, if the Jespersen unequal 
burdens test were applied in this context, it is precisely the latter conclusion that 
the plaintiff would be required to establish in order to prevail on her claim of 
discrimination. In effect, application of the unequal burdens test would require a 
procrustean transformation of the plaintiff’s original complaint—that the 8 a.m. 
arrival policy is objectionably discriminatory because it applies only to female 
employees—into the patently distinct claim that the employer’s arrival and 
 
 67. See id. at 1110 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977)) (alteration added). 
 68. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110. 
 69. See id. at 1111. 
 70. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 71. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 6–7, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 
No. 03-15045 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/ 
LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/360.pdf (“Harrah’s . . . tries to recast Jespersen’s challenge to the makeup 
policy as a test of the casino’s appearance requirements as a whole, much as the trial court did. But 
Jespersen has challenged only one aspect of the policy, the makeup requirement, and has no quarrel 
with its other elements.”). 
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departure policies, taken together, are objectionably discriminatory because the 
overall burdens created by those policies are greater in magnitude for female 
employees than they are for males. 
What we should really want to say about the Personal Punctuality program 
is simply that it is, by the employer’s own admission, discriminatory in two 
respects: the 8 a.m. arrival requirement discriminates against women, and the 6 
p.m. departure restriction discriminates against men.72 Any comparison of the 
burdens created by these ostensibly paired restrictions should seem beside the 
point. 
So what happened in Jespersen? The court simply sidestepped the problem 
of justifying the relevance of comparative burdens by assuming, without 
argument, that the Personal Best policy had to be evaluated as a whole, rather 
than “pars[ed]” into its component requirements.73 With this ipse dixit, the court 
flatly rejected even the possibility that each of the two components of the 
policy—the one imposing various restrictions on women and the other on 
men—might have been independently discriminatory,74 which left as the only 
remaining theory of liability the claim that the Personal Best policy was 
discriminatory in respect of the comparative magnitude of the burdens that it 
created. 
The evident implausibility of applying the equal burdens test in the case of 
my hypothetical disparate punctuality policy shows that the use of the test in 
the context of sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation presupposes 
that there is something special about dress and grooming restrictions that 
warrants a sui generis approach.75 Thus, the fact that a set of sex-dependent 
 
 72. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 246–47 
(2004) (describing the unequal burdens approach as endorsing a “double for nothing” claim 
whereby “two instances of discrimination add[] up to none” (alteration added)). 
 73. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. In support of this assumption, the court cited a decision in 
which the Eighth Circuit had upheld a hair-length restriction that was applicable only to male 
employees against a Title VII challenge, because Congress likely did not intend for the statute to 
have such “sweeping implications” and the male hair-length restriction at issue was part of a 
reasonable and “comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all employees.” Knott v. Mo. 
Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit, however, provided no more of 
an explanation than the Jespersen court as to why the hair-length restriction itself could not be 
discriminatory, even assuming that the policy of which it was a part was applied evenly to all 
employees. 
 74. Judge Pregerson in his dissenting opinion resisted this move. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1116 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“The fact that a policy contains sex-differentiated requirements that affect 
people of both genders cannot excuse a particular requirement from scrutiny.”). Interestingly, Judge 
Kozinski in his separate dissent stated his agreement with the majority’s insistence that the 
challenged makeup requirement be evaluated in the context of the Personal Best policy as a whole 
but argued that it was obvious that the policy did in fact create a greater burden for women than for 
men. See id. at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 75. Doubts about the relevance of unequal burdens analysis to disparate treatment claims are 
only further accentuated when one considers how impertinent such an analysis would be in a case 
involving restrictions on personal presentation that involved a forbidden classification other than 
sex, such as race or national origin. Suppose, for example, that a restaurant owner tried to enforce a 
workplace rule that required, say, all and only Asian employees to wear conical rice-field hats 
secured with a chin strap. In a discrimination challenge by the Asian employees, would it not be 
outrageous for a court to entertain seriously the restaurant owner’s claim that the requirement was 
not discriminatory because an equally burdensome requirement—say, the wearing of a cowboy 
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restrictions might—considered as a single policy—create burdens of equal 
magnitude for male and female employees does not adequately answer the 
question whether we should regard such restrictions as objectionable 
discrimination, absent some account of why equality of burdens should be given 
such prominence of consideration in this context. 
VII. CONCERN FOR EQUALITY 
So it seems, once again, that we still have made little progress in 
understanding why sex-dependent workplace restrictions on personal 
presentation should receive special and distinctive consideration under the laws 
governing sex discrimination. To make headway, we must consider the basic 
concerns and commitments that we take to be embodied in Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination because of sex. 
A useful place to start is with an argument that can be traced back to the 
well-known case of Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.76 There, the 
Fifth Circuit majority reasoned that it was not objectionably discriminatory for 
an employer to require male employees to wear their hair short, while allowing 
female employees to wear their hair at any length.77 This, as the Court explained, 
was because the purpose of Title VII is to ensure equality of employment 
opportunities among men and women and “to give all persons equal access to 
the job market.”78 Title VII’s purpose is not to abolish every sex-dependent 
practice from the workplace, no matter how significant the effect of a particular 
practice on the equal availability of employment opportunities.79 The Court 
quoted favorably from the D.C. Circuit’s per curiam opinion in Dodge v. Giant 
Food, in which that court had characterized sex-dependent grooming restrictions 
as workplace regulations “which do not represent any attempt by the employer 
to prevent the employment of a particular sex, and which do not pose distinct 
employment disadvantages for one sex.”80 The Dodge court had noted that 
“[n]either sex is elevated by these regulations to an appreciably higher 
occupational level than the other.”81 
We can grant that Title VII’s proscription of sex discrimination should be 
interpreted as aiming to ensure that men and women enjoy formal equality of 
 
hat—was imposed on non-Asian employees? I assume that most courts would analyze this sort of 
race-dependent workplace restriction on dress as facially discriminatory, and that any further 
examination of whether it creates an equal burden for employees of all races would be entirely 
immaterial. Cf. Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14963 (D.N.J. 2004) (holding 
that an otherwise unobjectionable restriction on male hair length stated a claim for discrimination 
where the restriction’s application was alleged to depend on consideration of race). Again, we are 
left to ask why matters should be different in the case of sex-dependent dress and grooming 
restrictions. 
 76. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
 77. See id. at 1092. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id.; see also Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (making a 
similar argument). 
 80. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted). 
 81. Id. 
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opportunity.82 But the argument of Willingham and Dodge—that sex-dependent 
restrictions on dress and grooming should not be regarded as objectionably 
discriminatory simply because they do not affect the overall balance of 
opportunities or positions formally available to women relative to men—surely 
proves too much. For, on that reasoning, an employer could, consistent with 
Title VII, enforce whatever sex-dependent workplace restrictions it wanted with 
impunity, as long as it kept all of its positions open to members of both sexes. 
Clearly, this is not the way that we would want to understand Title VII’s 
proscription of sex discrimination, and courts have not limited the application of 
Title VII in that way. Thus, for example, a workplace restriction can constitute 
sex discrimination even if its application is limited to a highly sought-after 
position that is filled predominantly by members of the sex to whom the 
restriction applies (and hence could not be regarded as diminishing the 
opportunities available to them).83 Even an employer who satisfies the 
requirements of providing equality of opportunity to men and women can run 
afoul of the sex discrimination laws if it applies conditions of employment that 
are expressly tied to an employee’s sex.84 Moreover, the decisional law 
concerning the impermissibility of employer enforcement of sex stereotypes 
makes clear that Title VII not only mandates equality of opportunity, but also 
places substantive limits on an employer’s ability to require that those 
employees conform their behavior to certain types of sex-dependent norms as a 
condition of employment.85 
That puts us back to where we started. For we are left again asking why 
sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation should not be regarded as 
per se discriminatory conditions of employment, and why they should be 
excluded from the ambit of norms that are legally regarded as ones that 
reinforce sex-based stereotypes. 
Let us think about the purpose of Title VII’s proscription of sex 
discrimination in a somewhat more general way than the Willingham court had 
occasion to do. Everyone agrees that Title VII as it relates to sex should be 
interpreted as having the aim of ensuring that men and women enjoy a certain 
kind of equality.86 But we can understand the equality that the statute fosters as 
 
 82. Ironically, the inclusion of “sex” as a protected classification in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 reportedly resulted from an amendment introduced by a conservative congressman who 
was believed to be opposed to the legislation as a whole but who thought that the amendment 
would hinder its passage. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090 (citing Note, Employer Dress and 
Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965, 968 (1973); Note, 
Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971)). 
 83. See Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606–08 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting airline’s 
argument that its maximum weight requirements for female flight attendants were not 
discriminatory because the position was regarded as highly desirable in spite of that requirement). 
 84. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 131–32 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 85. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (plurality opinion); Smith 
v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 571–74 (2004); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
 86. Cf. Hugh Collins, Social Inclusion: A Better Approach to Equality Issues?, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 897, 908 (2005) (“Most explanations of antidiscrimination laws support the view 
that the aim of the legislation is to promote some conception of equality.”). 
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comprising at least three separable ideas. First, antidiscrimination laws in 
general express a commitment to what might be called a principle of substantive 
moral equality or anti-subordination,87 teaching that all individuals are entitled 
to equal moral and legal respect and, more specifically, that an individual’s 
moral and social standing cannot depend on the individual’s race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin. Second, Title VII mandates a certain formal equality 
of treatment in the employment context, meaning (roughly) that male and 
female employees who are alike should be treated alike.88 And third, it promotes 
a degree of distributive equality, meaning (roughly) that male and female 
employees should enjoy some measure of substantive equality in certain kinds 
of goods89 they receive in relation to any given employment situation.90 If we 
accept these three basic postulates, we have a slightly more focused way of 
framing the question at hand. To wit: do sex-dependent workplace restrictions 
on personal presentation give rise to objections from any of these notions of 
equality; and if so, can those objections be overcome? 
Consider, first, the objection of formal inequality. The principle of formal 
equality is commonly expressed through the maxim “like cases ought to be 
treated alike.”91 To be a bit more fussy, we might say that the principle of formal 
equality is potentially violated, and a possible objection of formal inequality 
arises, whenever some consideration is treated as sufficient reason to take 
adverse action with regard to a person P, yet that same action would not be 
taken with regard to some person Q as to whom that same consideration was 
equally applicable.92 
Understood in terms of this simple schema, a potential objection of formal 
inequality could arise in virtually every case involving a sex-dependent 
restriction on personal presentation. That is, in every case in which an adverse 
action is based on an employee’s violation of a sex-dependent restriction, the 
affected employee will be able to assert that the same adverse action would not 
be taken with regard to some other employee (viz., an employee of the opposite 
sex) who engaged in that same conduct. In Jespersen, for example, an objection 
 
 87. See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (explaining the anti-subordination principle in the context of the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 88. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1777 (2002) (observing that “formal equality arguments dominate 
antidiscrimination caselaw” and discussing critically why this might be so). 
 89. I am using “goods” to refer not only to property and income but also employment 
opportunities, job security, access to positions of power, and so forth. 
 90. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); 
cf. Sarah E. Burns, Apologia for the Status Quo, 74 GEO. L.J. 1791, 1795–96 (1986) (book review) 
(distinguishing distributive inequality and formal inequality of treatment as “dual mechanisms” of 
sex discrimination). 
 91. See Patrick S. Shin, Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim: the Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz, 82 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 431, 452–53 (2005); see generally Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian 
Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000). 
 92. Actually, my own view is that the principle of formal equality has a slightly more complex 
structure than this, but I do not think further elaboration would be helpful here. I develop a 
comprehensive account of the principle of formal equality elsewhere. See Patrick S. Shin, The Formal 
Interpretation of Equal Treatment (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
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from formal inequality could be articulated as follows: Darlene Jespersen was 
fired for refusing to wear facial makeup, yet at the same time, male bartenders 
who did not wear facial makeup were not subject to termination.93 In this way, 
Jespersen—like any employee aggrieved by a sex-dependent restriction—could 
raise a potential objection of formal inequality. 
Of course, as is often observed, objections of formal inequality are all too 
easy to sidestep. The claim that the ostensibly different treatment of individuals 
violates the principle of treating like cases alike is almost always readily met 
with an obvious response: the differential treatment in question is not, after all, 
objectionable because the individuals in question were not similar in relevant 
respects. Thus, as to Jespersen, if the charge of unequal treatment is understood 
to be that Jespersen was treated differently from male bartenders, the 
employer’s ready response is that she was not “similar” to those other 
employees in all relevant respects. 
There is a temptation to dismiss formal equality objections because they are 
vacuous in the sense just demonstrated, absent some specification of what 
counts as a “relevant” difference or similarity. But arriving at this specification is 
precisely the value of working through an objection from formal inequality. 
Such objections force us to think about the substantive principles to which we 
would have to commit ourselves in order to regard particular differences 
between individuals as relevant or not; they force us to specify some 
institutionally legitimate principle under which the ostensibly differential 
treatment at issue could be regarded as rationally consistent. 
The question implicated by the formal inequality objection, then, is whether 
there is such a principle—a principle that is consistent with antidiscrimination 
law as a whole, that would allow us to say that Darlene Jespersen was in some 
sense relevantly different from her male counterparts. I will return to this 
question—which I take to be of central importance—at the end of this 
discussion. Before doing that, though, let us consider the other objections from 
inequality that I mentioned. For even if the formal inequality objection can be 
met, the defender of sex-dependent dress and grooming restrictions must still 
answer objections from the principle of substantive equality (the anti-
subordination principle)94 and objections from distributive inequality. I now turn 
to these objections. 
Sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation may be objectionable 
under the principle of substantive equality to the extent that they depend upon 
or express a judgment that women are in some way less worthy of respect than 
men (or vice versa), or have a lesser legal, moral, or social standing and hence 
are less entitled to object to unfavorable treatment. One might argue that all sex-
dependent restrictions of the sort we have been discussing are objectionable in 
this way—that all such restrictions applicable to women depend on or express a 
judgment that women are morally or legally inferior to men, and all such 
restrictions applicable to men depend on or express the opposite judgment. But 
 
 93. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 94. I am indebted to my colleague Jessica Silbey for urging me to consider this objection 
explicitly. 
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this claim seems too strong.95 No such judgment would seem to be implied, for 
example, by a workplace uniform policy that required women to wear blue caps 
and men to wear green ones. Yet, it would be hard to deny that some sex-
dependent presentational restrictions could be objectionable under a principle of 
substantive equality. A policy that required women to wear a demeaning 
costume while permitting men to wear ordinary attire, for example, would 
rather starkly evince the attitude that women are subservient to (heterosexual) 
men as objects of desire and sexual gratification rather than agents who share 
co-equal social, moral and legal standing. Whether the same could be said for a 
policy that required female employees to wear makeup (while forbidding males 
from doing so) is perhaps more open to argument. If such an argument could be 
made, the policy would be objectionable under a principle of substantive 
equality or anti-subordination. Assuming that the sex discrimination provisions 
of Title VII embody such a principle, it would follow that the policy should be of 
potential statutory concern. More generally, sex-dependent workplace 
restrictions on personal presentation seem to me potentially, but not necessarily, 
objectionable under a principle of substantive equality or anti-subordination. 
A similar account can be given with regard to the objection from 
distributive inequality. There are at least three potential ways in which sex-
dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation might be thought 
objectionable from the viewpoint of distributive equality. First, one might argue 
that such restrictions tend, on the whole, to create distributive inequalities 
between men and women regarding employment-related economic goods and 
opportunities such as job positions, opportunities for advancement, 
employment-based income, etc. Second, it could be argued that such restrictions 
may tend to produce distributive inequalities between men and women with 
regard to less tangible (non-economic) and psychic goods such as inequalities in 
social standing, psychological well-being, or self-respect. Third, one might argue 
that sex-dependent restrictions produce distributive inequalities between men 
and women with regard to the options they have as to their mode and manner of 
presenting themselves in the workplace. 
Whether any of these potential objections have any force seems a largely 
empirical matter. Offhand, it is not obvious that the enforcement of sex-
dependent restrictions on dress and grooming within the workplace should, 
simply by virtue of being sex-dependent, tend to produce inequalities between 
men and women with respect to job opportunities, desirable positions, income, 
or other economic goods. I want to make clear, however, what I am suggesting 
here. To this end, it might be useful to distinguish between restrictions that 
simply reinforce conventionally gendered social norms and restrictions that are 
artificial, contrived, or synthetic. Insofar as the actual history of conventionally 
gendered norms governing dress and grooming is entangled with our social 
history of sex and gender inequality, it seems plausible that some sex-dependent 
 
 95. In a sense, workplace restrictions that require employees to dress and groom themselves in 
a manner specified by the employer are inherently subordinating: they subordinate the employee to 
the employer. See Fisk, supra note 39, at 1119–20. But the question of concern here is whether such 
restrictions have a tendency to subordinate women to men (or vice versa) in a way that depends on 
or expresses a judgment of legal, moral or social inferiority. 
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restrictions reinforcing such norms might perpetuate such inequalities, 
including various forms of distributive inequalities.96 It is less obvious that 
artificial sex-dependent restrictions could have such effects.97 (Consider again a 
silly rule requiring women to wear green and men to wear blue.) The point is 
that the merit of the first objection from distributive inequality cannot be 
determined a priori: whether sex-dependent restrictions on personal 
presentation tend to create distributive economic inequalities is an empirical 
question that depends, inter alia, on the nature of the restriction in question. 
Some probably do, and some probably do not.98 
Similarly, as to the second potential objection from distributive inequality, 
it would be difficult to say, without due empirical investigation, that sex-
dependent restrictions on dress and grooming in general tend to produce sex-
based inequalities in social standing, psychological well-being, or self-respect. 
Yet it also seems true that some such restrictions could be expected to have 
precisely that tendency.99 
 
 96. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1395, 1432 (1992) (arguing that laws that endorse conventionally gendered norms of dress and 
grooming “legitimate the existing allocation of gender roles and expectations . . . [and] therefore 
reinforces gender inequality, male domination, and the subordination of women”); cf. Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace 
Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2569 (1994) (arguing that we should be wary of even apparently 
“trivial” norms such as the rule that women wear skirts and so should “ask whether there is 
something in the cultural coding of skirts that disadvantages their wearers by making them seem, 
say, less professional and more ornamental or vulnerable than those who wear pants”). 
 97. Thus, from the perspective of the first distributive inequality objection, the usual legal 
attitude of permissiveness toward conventionally gendered restrictions and skepticism toward 
artificial ones, cf. Post, supra note 3, at 29–30 (arguing that the case law tends to regard restrictions 
that “track” conventional norms as nondiscriminatory and those that “violate” traditional standards 
as discriminatory), seems in some ways completely backward. 
 98. If we include leisure time (time not expended on employment-related activities) as a 
relevant category of goods, one might argue that the makeup requirement at issue in Jespersen 
provides a straightforward example of a presentational restriction that tends to produce a 
distributive economic inequality. This point was taken by Judge Kozinski to be perfectly obvious. See 
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 99. Thus, for example, a workplace policy requiring men but not women to wear a necktie 
might not give rise to the second distributive inequality objection (at least not in any immediately 
apparent way), see Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977), but a policy 
requiring female employees to wear a demeaning uniform that increased the potential of sexual 
harassment would be seriously problematic for the reasons embodied in the second distributive 
inequality objection—viz., in virtue of its tendency to result in a differential diminishment of the 
social standing of women or in an erosion of the social foundations of their ability to enjoy self-
respect. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding sex discrimination 
where female employee was required to wear revealing uniform that led to her being sexually 
harassed); see also Marentette v. Mich. Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (similar, but 
dismissing complaint on other grounds). I do not deny that restrictions on dress and grooming 
might, in general, tend to have an adverse effect on everyone’s psychological well-being or self-respect 
insofar as such restrictions tend to inhibit personal expression and may force some individuals to 
present themselves in a manner that is at odds with their self-image or practical identity. But one 
would not think—although this is little more than conjecture—that such restrictions by their nature 
would affect men or women differentially, thereby producing inequalities in the distribution of 
psychic goods or self-respect. Of course, the unequal application of sex-dependent restrictions might 
produce such inequalities; any policy that called for such uneven application might very well be 
objectionable on the basis of this second objection from distributive inequality. See Carroll v. Talman 
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The third potential objection based on distributive inequality argues that 
sex-dependent restrictions are problematic not just to the extent that they 
indirectly give rise to inequality in the distribution of economic goods or psychic 
goods (such as the social bases of self-respect), but because they directly affect 
the distribution of valuable goods: the options available for choosing one’s 
manner of personal presentation in the workplace. It seems to me perfectly 
plausible to say that these options are of real value to us. Being employed, after 
all, often means spending the majority of one’s waking hours in the workplace, 
and insofar as we have reason to care about how we present the surface of our 
physical bodies to others in that context, we have reason to care about the 
options available to us for such presentation. By the same token, gross 
inequalities in the distribution of such options should raise cause for concern, 
either because they are inherently unjust or because such inequalities might be 
symptomatic of other unjust conditions in the particular institutional contexts in 
which they arise.100 
Thus, one might object to a requirement forcing female employees to wear 
contact lenses instead of glasses while allowing male employees the option of 
wearing either on the straightforward grounds that such a requirement would 
reduce the options available to women relative to men in respect of the overall 
number of permissible modes of personal presentation.101 In contrast, one might 
think that a policy that female employees wear makeup, if paired with a policy 
that prohibited male employees from doing the same, would not give rise to an 
objection from inequality of presentational options, insofar as the paired 
requirements would not create any inequality in the overall number of such 
options available to men versus women.102 
There are some obvious problems with reading Title VII to encompass a 
concern for distributive equality with respect to presentational options in the 
workplace. First of all, the case law to date has not seriously attempted to read 
any such concern into the statute. Indeed, many cases are hard to reconcile with 
such an interpretation. For example, there is a long line of decisions that refuse 
to regard as actionably discriminatory sex-dependent hair-length restrictions 
that require men to wear their hair short while not imposing any similar 
 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that employer’s 
requirement that all and only women wear a particular uniform while men were allowed to choose 
their own attire was “demeaning to women” and constituted disparate treatment in violation of Title 
VII); see also O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Oh. 1987) 
(finding sex discrimination on similar grounds, where female employees, but not males, were 
required to wear a “smock”). 
 100. For example, if a particular workplace had a prevalence of sex-dependent restrictions on the 
options for personal presentation available to female employees that were unpaired with 
comparable restrictions on males, then that might be thought symptomatic of deeper conditions of 
inequality within that workplace. 
 101. See Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 789–90 (D.D.C. 1973) (concluding that 
precisely such a policy was discriminatory), vacated in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); see also Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33. Note that I argued above that the outcome in Carroll might 
also be explained in terms of the second objection from distributive inequality. Thus, any given 
particular sex-dependent restriction might be objectionable on more than one ground, and my 
arguments should not be understood to suggest otherwise. 
 102. This sort of argument would of course tend to support the outcome in Jespersen. 
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limitation on women.103 Similarly problematic is my simple hypothetical case of 
the employer who terminates the male employee for wearing a frilly pink dress. 
One would think that such unpaired, sex-dependent restrictions should provide 
straightforward examples of sex discrimination if the statute were read to 
encompass a concern for distributive inequality with respect to presentational 
options. But those particular restrictions are not considered discriminatory 
under current case law. 
A further and more fundamental skeptical worry about the equality of 
options rationale is whether the right way to measure the aggregate value of a 
set of options is simply to count them. There is substantial reason to doubt 
whether we should be content to regard any paired set of sex-dependent 
restrictions as non-discriminatory simply on the assumption that the pairing 
will ensure that the restrictions do not create any distributive inequality with 
respect to presentational options, because the value of the options eliminated by 
the paired restrictions might be very different. For example, it might be true that 
a restriction requiring women to wear makeup while forbidding men from 
doing so would not create any inequality across sex in the total number of 
options held. However, one wonders whether something important is being 
missed if we ignore the possibility that the option to wear makeup might not 
have the same value for men (whether in the aggregate, or in particular cases) as 
the option not to wear makeup might have for women.104 In other words, 
counting the total number of presentational options affected by a particular 
restriction might not be the best, or even a useful, way of measuring distributive 
inequalities. 
I am doubtful that this difficulty can be adequately resolved. If it cannot, 
then it likely spells doom for the usefulness of thinking about distributive 
equality with respect to presentational options at all, unless a systematic method 
can be developed for assigning values to particular options regarding personal 
presentation. Still, it is worth being aware of the equality of options rationale, 
because for all its problems, I think it has sufficient surface plausibility to help 
explain the tendency of courts like Jespersen to presume the permissibility of 
paired sex-dependent restrictions on workplace presentation. 
To summarize, there are at least three ideas of equality under which sex-
dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation might be regarded as 
objectionable: the principle of formal equality, the principle of substantive 
equality (or of anti-subordination), and various notions of distributive equality. 
To the extent that these precepts of equality describe the fundamental purposes 
of Title VII, one strategy for justifying the permissibility of sex-dependent 
workplace restrictions on personal presentation might be to show that such 
restrictions—either in general, or in particular cases—do not raise serious 
 
 103. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y. 
Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); 
Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Airlines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash 
Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1254 (N.D. 
Ind. 1998). 
 104. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (making a similar point). 
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concerns under any of these principles. If one could show this, one might 
succeed in establishing that such restrictions should be regarded as being 
outside the ambit of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of sex. 
The majority’s opinion in Jespersen seems to me best understood as an 
inchoate attempt at this kind of argument. The trouble is—and perhaps this is 
why Jespersen is ultimately so unsatisfying—the court’s unequal burdens 
approach seems to presuppose that the only potential equality objection 
implicated by the casino’s “Personal Best” policy was that it might lead to an 
inequality of distribution with regard to the burdens of compliance with the 
policy as a whole. But that presupposition requires a peculiarly narrow view of 
the types of inequalities that are of potential concern to Title VII. The Jespersen 
majority was surely right to assume that dress and grooming restrictions that 
create unequal burdens of compliance are potentially objectionable as sex 
discrimination, but it failed to take seriously the possibility that the Personal 
Best policy or its individual components might be objectionable under other 
notions of equality that are central to the statute. 
In particular, the Jespersen court completely ignored the potential objection 
of formal inequality to the casino’s makeup requirement. So let us now return to 
the discussion of that objection that I earlier postponed.105 The formal inequality 
objection, again, is that the casino’s makeup policy suffered from a sort of 
rational inconsistency: it called for adverse action against Jespersen on the basis 
of her refusal to wear makeup, while not calling for adverse action against her 
male counterparts even though they also did not wear makeup. As I conceded 
above, that claim of inequality is not especially interesting in itself, because the 
response is so obvious: Jespersen’s differential treatment under the makeup 
policy was justified because she was relevantly different from her male 
counterparts. 
Here, however, is the rub. A purported difference between individuals that 
might otherwise rationalize their different treatment cannot be considered 
relevant if there is some institutionally authoritative principle saying that the 
purported difference cannot provide sufficient reason for the type of action at 
issue.106 For example, if an employer fires P for doing x yet fails to fire Q for 
doing the same thing, the employer could not defeat a claim of formal inequality 
by citing the fact that P was Asian, while Q was Caucasian. Obviously, the 
antidiscrimination laws tell us that this purported difference cannot provide a 
legitimate reason for treating P and Q differently. Thus, the employer could not 
answer the objection by appealing to that particular difference. 
In Jespersen, just what is the relevant difference between Jespersen and her 
male counterparts? The claim implicit in the formal inequality objection—the 
substantive claim that gives the formal objection its moral significance—is that 
the only difference between them was their sex and that there is no 
institutionally legitimate principle under which that consideration could have 
provided a permissible reason for treating Jespersen differently. This last claim, I 
contend, is the real crux of the formal inequality objection. It is a claim that 
cannot go unaddressed, because it seeks to dislodge the hidden linchpin of 
 
 105. See supra p. 513. 
 106. See Shin, supra note 91, at 453–55. 
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Jespersen—the assumption that it is not per se illegitimate (i.e., discriminatory) to 
make workplace restrictions on presentation depend on consideration of sex, 
and that is only impermissible to do so if such restrictions create distributive 
inequalities or subordinate one sex to the other.107 
So, what would it take to overcome this challenge? What would have to be 
true in order for Jespersen’s objection to fail? The answer is straightforward: in 
order for Jespersen’s objection from formal equality to fail, there must exist 
some institutionally legitimate principle under which the very fact that 
Jespersen is a woman could provide sufficient reason to treat her differently 
from her male counterparts. 
Is there such a principle? One thing is certain: if my analysis is correct, the 
existence of such a principle is necessarily implicit in the current decisional law 
permitting sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation to survive 
discrimination analysis. In other words, if those decisions are regarded as 
consistent with principles of formal equality,108 we must also regard them as 
committed to the existence of some institutionally legitimate principle that 
allows an employee’s sex to be a relevant reason for holding her to one 
presentational standard while holding employees of the opposite sex to different 
standards. If there is no such principle, then those cases must be wrongly 
decided. 
But, again, if there is such a principle, what could it be? Any answer here is 
bound to be controversial, but it would have to be founded on a notion that we, 
as a society, have reason to value and therefore preserve a state of affairs in 
which certain types of behaviors relating to the manner of presenting oneself to 
others are engaged in predominantly by members of one sex but not the other.109 
To put it another way, the rationalizability of sex-dependent workplace-
presentation rules must depend on the idea that, even granting that sex and 
gender or gender-performance can be conceptually disaggregated,110 we 
nevertheless have reason to maintain a state of affairs in which sex and gender 
remain linked as a matter of fact—i.e., a state of affairs in which biological males 
behave in masculine ways and biological females behave in feminine ways. 
Insofar as that idea could be considered institutionally basic,111 one could posit, 
as an institutionally legitimate principle, that employees have no right to 
demand that adverse employment actions based on the manner of their personal 
presentation be justified in terms that do not appeal to consideration of sex. The 
 
 107. The need to consider the formal equality objection (and, more importantly, the substantive 
principles that such an objection implicates) can be seen most clearly in a case of paired restrictions 
that do not produce any substantive or material inequalities—e.g., a requirement that female 
employees wear blue caps and that male employees wear green ones. Ignoring the formal equality 
objection would ignore the possibility that such a restriction could be objectionable even absent any 
proof of associated substantive or material inequalities. 
 108. On my view, principles of formal equality ultimately reduce to requirements of rational 
consistency, and we ordinarily presume that the law on the whole is itself rationally consistent. 
 109. My remarks here are limited to the context of conduct relating to personal presentation in 
the workplace. 
 110. See generally Case, supra note 2. 
 111. By an institutionally basic value, I mean a value that determines the institution’s principles 
of justification but cannot itself be justified in institutional terms. 
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real upshot of the formal inequality objection to sex-dependent restrictions on 
personal presentation, then, is a challenge to this substantive principle and the 
basic values it embodies. The thrust of the formal objection is that we are not 
justified in valuing a state of affairs in which the linkage of sex and gender 
persists.112 
At this juncture, I offer no view as to whether the value being imagined 
here—the social value of a linkage between sex and gender—is defensible;113 nor 
do I offer any argument as to whether such a value could ultimately be 
consistent with a general commitment to substantive and distributive equality 
among the sexes, or to antidiscrimination law generally. My claim is only that a 
commitment to this value must be presumed to underlie the body of law that 
says that sex-dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation do not 
constitute sex discrimination. As we have seen, much of the surface logic that 
courts have employed to uphold sex-dependent presentational restrictions 
against challenges of discrimination turns out to be, on the whole, inconclusive 
at best and at times little more than exercises in question-begging. In the end, 
perhaps the doctrinal confusions and tangles those decisions seem to engender 
are best understood as the result of trying to reconcile a commitment to ensuring 
that men and women enjoy a meaningful parity of economic, social, and psychic 
well-being with a desire to preserve a social decorum that keeps them 
behaviorally distinct: Let substantive and economic equality obtain, but vive la 
différence. 
 
 112. It could be possible, of course, that we might not be morally justified in seeking to enforce a 
linkage of sex and gender even if the value of such a linkage was institutionally basic. In that case, 
the further question would be the extent to which antidiscrimination law could be regarded as 
aiming at the transformation of that basic value. Cf. Post, supra note 3, at 31–32 (arguing in favor of a 
conception of antidiscrimination law that recognizes some social practices as “inevitable” and even 
constitutive of categories such as race and gender while at the same time seeking to transform or 
reshape such practices). 
 113. What would have to be proved in order to defend this value is not that there is a social 
value attributable to the fact that men and women present themselves differently in the workplace, 
but that—and this is in my view a more difficult proposition—whatever it is of value that subsists in 
sex-differentiated behavior in respect of dress and grooming could not be preserved (or would be 
diminished) if gender differences were not tightly linked to sex. 
